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POPULAR AND LEGAL VIEWS
OIF"
TRAFFIC POOLING.
By HON. T. M. COOLEY,
Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan and Professor of Constitutional Law in ft Universityof Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. u
RBQAP

POPULAR AND LEGAL VIEWS
OF
TRAFFIC POOLING.
Perhaps nothing in respect to the relations between the railroad
companies and the public attracts more attention at the present time
than the arrangements to which the name of pooling is popularly
given. In railroad circles these arrangements are looked upon as
necessary to prevent all railroad property becoming absolutely
worthless to the stockholders, as a very large part of it is now; and
those managers who are hoping to earn dividends are therefore labor
ing earnestly to make these arrangements effectual. On the other
hand, an impression is largely prevalent that pooling contracts are
contrivances whereby inequality and excess in rates can be "main
tained, and a monopoly injurious to the public interest established;
and they are by many persons condemned as being unquestionably
wrong if not absolutely illegal. As the relations between the public
and the railroads are so necessary, so constant and so extensive as
to make harmony between them in all that relates to railroad service
of very high importance, it seems desirable to give some attention to
these arrangements—their nature, their purpose and their legality—
and to bring together some considerations bearing upon these points
respectively, with a view to giving in brief space the means of form
ing some opinion in respect to them. Space will not admit of this
being done with any completeness, but perhaps the salient points
may be presented. What is said will refer especially to pooling in
freight traffic, but in principle it will apply to passenger traffic also.
WHAT THEY ARE.
The pooling arrangements between railroads in this country have
not all been on the same plan, but it is probably not important now
to take notice of any attempts in that direction which have been
made and then abandoned. The suggestion of pooling, though
likely, perhaps, to occur anywhere, comes to us from England,
where pooling contracts in the railroad business and others of a
semi-public nature have been held not to be illegal, both when they
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were made on the basis of an equal division of profits (') and where
the basis was a division of business between the contracting par
ties. (2). In this country the method of pooling seems to be for the
several contracting parties to create some common authority upon
which will be conferred the power to establish and change rates for
the transportation of property within a certain territory or over a
certain line, and also to apportion the business between them. The
apportionment will be made upon a consideration of what the com
panies severally would be likely to obtain under the operation of free
competition, and it will be changed from time to time if found to be
relatively unjust. The feature of arbitration upon controversies
arising between the contracting parties will also be prominent in the
arrangement. The contract will be made for a definite term of
years, with liberty to dissatisfied parties to withdraw upon reason
able notice, and it will be likely to provide that a commission act
ing for all shall give direction to shipments when this shall be neces
sary to give each road its allotted share. But as shippers will have
a legal right to have their property transported by a line of their
own selection, it may well happen that some roads will carry more
and some less than their proportion, and provision will therefore be
necessary for a periodical adjustment of balances, and for the pay
ment of moneys from one to another as may be needful, upon such
allowance for the business done above the allotted share as shall be
fixed upon as just. Perhaps clauses will be inserted in the contract
which will have for their purpose to make it for the interest of ship
pers to send forward their property according to the directions of
the commission, but compulsory power in this direction must prac
tically be very limited.
THEIR PURPOSE.
The avowed purpose in pooling is to avoid ruinous competition
between the several roads represented, and the unjust discrimination
between shippers which is found invariably to attend such compe
tition. The desirability of the last mentioned object is agreed to on
all hands. The existence of unjust discriminations is one of the
chief complaints made by the public against railroad management,
and one of the reasons always assigned for interference by law. It
may therefore be taken as agreed that, so far as pooling arrange
ments have the correction of this evil in view, the purpose is com
mendable.
(1) Hare vs. Railway Co., 2 Johnson & Hemming's Reports, 80.
(2) Collins vs. Locke, 4 Appeal Cases. 674.
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But the primary object unquestionably is self-protection againsi
ruinous competition; and it is not to be expected that as to this the
public opinion of the country will be prepared to give spontaneous
approval. A pooling arrangement is a combination; and all com
binations in a business which so intimately concerns the public look
like attempts to establish a monopoly, and may sometimes result in
establishing one. To monopoly the public is instinctively hostile,
because it takes from them the power of dealing on equal terms with
those who control it. Besides, a combination that has for its ob
ject to check competition, seems to stand in hostility to the indus
trial maxim that "competition is the life of trade," a maxim which
from time immemorial has been generally prevalent, and is com
monly supposed to be one admitting of no question and of universal
application. The advantages of unrestricted competition are ap
parent to the public in industrial life all about us ; and while in some
kinds of business this is sharp, yet selfishness is generally sufficiently
active and sufficiently intelligent to prevent its becoming ruinous.
It does not detract from the worth or soundness of the maxim that
under the operation of unrestricted competition individual disasters
must occur; for when this happens it is very likely to be found
either that the parties did not understand the business they were
engaged in, or managed badly, or lacked the necessary capital, or in
some other particulars were inadequately equipped. Against ruin
from these causes protection is impossible. The maxim referred to
is so commonly accepted that courts have made it a basis for impor
tant judgments; and it is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the
question should be made whether it is competent to erect barriers to
free competition in a business so important to the public as that
which is carried on by the railroads.
The answer made on behalf of the railroad companies is that the
business and the necessary preparation for carrying it on make their
case so peculiar that competition necessarily affects them in a way
different to that in which it affects others ; so different that it may
be destructive to them where to others it would only be stimulating
and wholesome. Some of the reasons which will be assigned for
this will be recognized by every one as possessing force. In most
kinds of business, competition easily and naturally regulates the
extent to which a business shall be carried on ; persons engage in it
only when they think they see a reasonable opening for profit; they
push the business with men and money when the promise of success
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is such as to warrant it, and when it is not, operations are reduced;
some, perhaps, go out of the business, and capital seeks other in
vestments. The merchant, when competition becomes too severe
for him, may turn farmer or manufacturer; the manufacturer may
change his line of production or temporarily reduce it; and these
changes it is generally possible to make without serious loss. Very
seldom the whole plant for one business will be useless for any
other. The general results of competition will therefore be such
that, while the public will have the benefit of low prices, a general
equilibrium of demand and supply will be maintained without bring
ing disaster to individuals.
Much of this is as different as possible in the railroad world. The
investment for the purposes of a railroad is permanent, and is avail
able to a single purpose only. If it cannot b2 made available for the
transportation of persons and property it is a wasted investment; as
much so as if it had been cast into the sea. But when the con
struction of railroads is entirely unrestricted, there is always a
tendency to build more than are needed, and more than can be
made profitable. The reasons for this are numerous. Eailroads
are a great local convenience ; every village wants one or more ; and
it is easy for plausible men, who see individual profit in their con
struction, to convince the local community that a road which will
accommodate their local needs must be profitable. If the law per
mits a levy of municipal taxes in aid of the local scheme, it will not
be difficult to obtain a popular vote in its favor; if taxation for the
purpose is not allowed, the popular credulity will be appealed to
with assurance of great increase in property from the building of a
road which will give easy access to market ; and men will give freely
in the expectation that in one way or another they will receive large
returns. Eoads have thus in many cases been constructed at gener
al expense in which a capitalist for the purpose of investment would
put nothing. But roads are also built under an expectation, on the
part of those who originate and push them, that in some way the
originators will be enabled to make them available for their individ
ual benefit, regardless of their real value; sometimes through hold
ing the control and managing them; sometimes by forcing the
owners of other roads to which they would be rivals to buy them.
For these and other reasons roads are brought into existence for
which there is no adequate demand, and whatever people have been
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induced to put in them is a dead loss. In some other countries the
government endeavors to provide against such losses by refusing
charters for roads which seem not to be called for by any public
need, or which can only be profitable by rendering worthless some
existing line; but the policy in this country has always been to
leave railroad building practically unrestricted, and the best and
most useful line, though it may fully accommodate the public need,
is never secure against being ruined by the construction of a rival
line which scheming and unscrupulous persons induce the credulous
to furnish the capital for.
ZBut such roads when constructed remain, and will be operated so
long as the cost of operating can be paid from the earnings}} They
may pass from the hands of stockholders into those of bondholders,
and though even then pay nothing upon the bonds they will con
tinue to be operated. This is the condition of very much of the
railroad property of the country to-day; hundreds of millions of the
capital invested in it is absolutely sunk, but the plant remains and
the road will be operated, though those whose property it represents
neither receive dividends upon their investment nor have any rea
sonable prospect that they ever will. (Tf then a company to which
the bankrupt company is a rival shall not only endeavor to pay
operating expenses and the interest on its indebtedness, but also to
pay dividends to stockholders, it must do so in competition with one
whose managers expect to pay no dividends, and no interest expect
as perhaps they may find it necessary to do so in Order to retain
controIT) Such a state of things can exist in no business from which
a transfer of capital is possible; and the competition it creates in
stead of being "the life of trade," is as to this business destructive
of the capital invested in it. It becomes a matter of necessity, then,
that the competition which is so likely to be destructive should be
restrained within limits which will admit of reasonable and reliable
prosperity; and some common arrangement between the roads
seems to be the only means yet found by which this can be accom
plished. The common arrangement agreed upon for the purpose is
that of pooling; it has grown out of the necessities of the case; and,
while it is necessary to the railroad companies, it is unjust to no
one. This, briefly and imperfectly stated, is the railroad view of
the necessity and propriety of pooling compacts.
It is proper to add to this statement that the want of harmony be
tween the railroad companies which has its most noticeable mani
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festations in wars of rates causes injury and inconvenience to the
public in ways which railroad managers in public discussions are
not likely to dwell upon or make prominent. In other kinds of
business when competition is unrestricted dealers find it to their
interest to study the convenience of the public, and to invite cus
tom by being as accommodating as possible ; and what they do in
this regard is no wrong or injury or inconvenience to their rivals,
but only incites them to be equally accommodating. But railroad
companies cannot be accommodating to the full extent of the pub
lic needs unless they are accommodating to each other; for a very
large proportion of those who have occasion to use their facilities, de
sire to pass, in person or with their property, from one road to another,
and wish to do this without unnecessary cost of transfer or unneces
sary delay. But hostile competition , while it may incite the roads to
run a race in popularity, also leads them to make many arrangements
which are inconsistent with the full accommodation to the public
which might be and ought to be given. Rival lines have their sta
tion buildings on different sides of a town when they might witb the
same convenience to ohemselves and with greater convenience to
the public be together; they have different station houses at cross
ings when one would answer for all ; their time tables are so ar
ranged as to cause inconvenience whenever a passenger leaves their
line to pass upon another which is not working in harmony with
them, and they establish soliciting agencies which are only made
important by the rivalry. In all these things the several companies
think they advance their individual interest in the competition ; but
in doing so they not only make the service they render to the public
less valuable but also more expensive. Some of the evils of unre
stricted competition have been generally recognized by those who
have been most earnest in demanding congressional legislation, and
it has been one feature of the bills introduced that restraints, more
or less considerable, should be imposed.
It is also proper to add that, whether the railroad companies
anticipate it or not, no pooling arrangement, unless the aid of the
law can be had for its enforcement, can possibly put an end to com
petition between them. The arrangement may regulate competition
but cannot stop it. The apportionment of business, as has been
said, will be made on a calculation of what the respective roads
would be likely to obtain under free competition ; and every com
pany, in view of the periodical readjustment of percentages, will be
7
interested in showing that its facilities and its management naturally
bring to it a larger proportion than it now receives ; and the rivalry
for public favor will go on as before, though it may be expected
that some of the features of rivalry which, when it is hostile, are
peculiarly injurious to the public, will be eliminated by the a_gree-
ment to work in harmony. Moreover the several soliciting agents
of the roads will have a personal interest in showing their value to
their employers by presenting good results from their service in the
employment; the permanent value of each road, as well as the
market value of its stock, will depend largely on the shares awarded
to it in the periodical readjustments; all the prejudices which con
cur in bringing about first secret and then public departures from
common agreements will only be repressed by the pooling, not re
moved ; and not only will competition continue notwithstanding the
common agreement, but it will by force of the circumstances be so
far active and efficient in keeping rates within bounds that one
would hazard nothing in saying that, within the territory whose
business is naturally affected by the competition of the trunk lines,
the period when rates can be controlled by combinations and kept
at figures limited only by the discretion or the greed of the mana
gers, is gone forever.
THE LEGALITY OF EAILEOAD POOLS.
But it is said that all contracts which have for their object to re
strain competition are illegal at the common law, because they are
in conflict with a general principle of public policy. The term illegal
is somewhat ambiguous. A contract may be illegal in the sense
that it is forbidden by a law which imposes some penalty for enter
ing into it, or it may be illegal because, though not forbidden, it is
considered to be of an injurious and demoralizing tendency, and
therefore the law will not favor it, but will refuse to lend its aid in
enforcement. If a contract is only illegal in this last sense, parties
are at perfect liberty to enter into it if they please, but performance
of its conditions must be entirely voluntary. It is under this head
that pooling contracts are supposed to come.
It is a familiar principle in the law that contracts in general re
straint of trade are void. Therefore if a man contracts with his rival
in business that for any agreed consideration he will no longer pur
sue his customary calling within the state in which he resides, the
promise is one he may keep at pleasure or break with impunity.
The reasons are that such a contract if enforced would deprive the
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public of the benefits of competition, and at the same time impose
restraints going far beyond what would be needful for protection to
the party bargaining for them. But it was always agreed that com
petition, in so far as it operated injuriously to individuals might
with. entire competency be limited by contract; and in a great va
riety of cases it has been held that a man may lawfully bargain to
put an end to an injurious competition in his business in the lo
cality where he carries it on, or that he may bargain to prevent the
establishment in that locality of a competing business which he fears
may be injurious. It is only when he exacts terms that go beyond
giving him protection that the law holds his contract to be unrea
sonable, injurious to the public, and therefore illegal. The reader
unfamiliar with the law reports will find many of the cases referred
to in the note ; and it will appear on an examination that in all of
them the legality of bargaining to limit competition, when it is
kept within the bounds of reasonable protection, is either assumed
or expressly affirmed. ('
)
The principle upon which these cases are decided is that by which
pooling arrangements, so far as concerns their legality, must stand
or fall. If they are illegal, it is because they establish unreasonable
restraints upon competition in business; if they can be supported in
law, it must be upon the ground that they only give to the parties
concerned that reasonable protection against competition which is
needful to their prosperity. Having this in mind it may be useful
to refer to such judicial decisions as seem to bear most directly upon
this peculiar class of contracts.
It has already been said that pooling arrangements have been sus
tained in Great Britain. One of the cases passed upon was a pool
ing arrangement between stevedores; another was between com
peting railroads; and in neither case was it deemed an objection that
the effect of the contract was to limit competition, or that this was
to be accomplished by a combination. In the railroad case (2
) Vice
Chancellor W. Page Wood said among other things: "It is a mis
taken notion that the public is benefited by putting two rail-
(1) The following cases are selected from the great number which recognize the prin
ciple, because the republication in the volumes here given is accompanied by valuable
notes and references: Mitchel vs. Reynolds. Smith's Leading Cases, 508; Perkins vs. Ly
man, 6 American Decisions 158; Pierce vs. Fuller, 5 American Decisions 102; Bowser vs.
Bliss, 43 American Decisions, 93; Grundy vs. Edwards, 23 American Decisions 409;
Morgan vs. Perliamus, 38American Reports 607; Pike vs. Thomas, 7 American Decisions,
741;Drill Company vs. Morse, 4 American Reports 513; Hoyt vs. Holly, 12American Re
ports, 390; Hubbard vs. Miller, 15American Reports 153; Cook vs . Johnson, 30American
Keports 64.
(2) Hare vs. Railway Co. 2 Johnson & Hemming's Reports 80.
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road companies against each other until one is ruined; the result
being at last to raise the fares to the highest possible standard."
Before either of these cases was decided it had been held by the
i supreme court of New York [in 1847] that a contract between the
proprietors of canal boats for fixing rates and for a division of net
earnings was void, though the object was expressed to be "to estab
lish and maintain fair and uniform rates of freight, and to equalize
the business of forwarding on the Erie and Oswego canals among
themselves, and to avoid all unnecessary expenses in doing the
same." The argument of the court is brief, and is summed up in
two short sentences: "The object of this combination was obvi
ously to destroy competition between the several lines in the busi
ness engaged in. It was a conspiracy, between the individuals con
tracting, to prevent a free competition among themselves, in the
business of transporting merchandise, property and passengers up
on the public canals." "It is a familiar maxim that competition is
the life of trade. It follows that whatever destroys or even relaxes
competition in trade is injurious if not fatal to it." (') Thus it will
be seen that by giving a bad name to the arrangement, and quot
ing the old maxim, the court was supposed to have sufficiently rea
soned the case out, and the judgment followed as of course. A
similar agreement was shortly afterwards condemned by the same
court, in the case of Stanton against Allen, (2
) as being designed to
exempt the standard of freights, etc., "from the wholesome influence
of rivalry and competition."
These cases have not passed entirely without criticism in this
country. They were cited to the supreme court of Wisconsin not
long after they were made, and were there dissented from in very
vigorous terms. (3
) Referring to the maxim that competition is the
life of trade, Judge Howe, speaking for the court, said that it "is
one of the least reliable of the host that may be picked up in every
market place. It is in fact the shibboleth of mere gambling specu
lation; and is hardly entitled to take rank as an axiom in the juris
prudence of this country. I believe universal observation will at
test that for the last quarter of a century competition in the trade
has caused more individual distress, if not more public injury, than
the want of competition. Indeed by reducing prices below or raising
them above values —as the nature of the trade prompted—competi-
(1) Hooker vs. Vandewater 4 Denio's Reports 349.
(2) 5 Demo's Reports 434.
(3) In Kellogg vs. Larkin 3 Chandler's Reports 133.
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tion has done more to monopolize trade, or to secure exclusive ad
vantages in it, than has been done by contract. Eivalry in trade
will destroy itself, and rival tradesmen, seeking to remove each
other, rarely resort to contract, unless they find it the cheapest mode
of putting an end to the strife. And it seems to me not a little re
markable that in the case of Stanton vs. Allen it should have been
urged against the agreement that its objeet was to exempt the
standard of freights, etc., 'from the wholesome influence of rivalry
and competition.' For it is very certain that because of that very
purpose —because they did tend to protect the party against the in
fluence of rivalry and competition—courts of law have upheld like
agreements in partial restraint of trade, ever since the case of Mit
chell vs. Reynolds." (')
But there are several other American cases which, in their general
reasoning, must be conceded to give some support to the cases de
cided in New York. Among these are the cases in which combina
tions between coal companies to control the production of coal and
its price in the market have been held illegal. (2
) An agreement be
tween dealers in a certain line of goods not to put any upon the
market for three months has also been held to be illegal. (3
) So has
a combination which had for it purpose to effect a corner in the
wheat market. (4
) So has a combination between parties furnishing
recruits in time of war, whereby they agree not to furnish them for
less than a fixed price. (s
) So have agreements not to compete in
bids for public contracts. («
) So have combinations to keep up the
price of Salt. (') And combinations to put up or to put down the
wages of laborers, whether entered into by laborers or by employers,
must in general depend for their observance upon the good faith of
those who make them. (°
) It would be easy to show that many of
these cases have no important bearing upon the question of the
legality of railroad pools, but they are likely to be brought under
consideration in any legal controversy on that subject, and the pro
priety of their being here referred to will therefore be apparent.
(1) This is the leading case on contracts in restraint of trade, and was decided in 1711:
1 P. Williams' Reports 181. 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 508.
(2) Morris Run Coal Co. vs. Barclay Coal Co. 68Penn. State Reports 173; Arnot vs. Coal
Co. 68 New York Reports 558.
(3) India Association vs. Kock, 14Louisiana Reports 168.
(4) Raymond vs. Leavitt 46 Michigan Reports 447.
(5) Marsh vs. Russell 66New York Reports 288.
(6) Atcheson vs. Mallon 43 New York Reports 147. People vs. Stephens 71New York
Reports 527. Ray vs. Mackin 100Illinois Reports 246. Swan vs. Chorpenning20Cali£ornia
Reports 182.
(7) Salt Co. vs. Guthrie. 35Ohio State Reports 666.
(8) Journeymen Taylors' Case, 8 Modern Reports 10; Commonwealth vs. Hunt, 4 Met-
calf's Reports 111; The Queen vs. Rowlands, 17 Queen's Bench Reports 671; Hilton vs.
Eckersly, 6 Ellis and Blackburn's Reports 47.
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In the light of the judicial decisions as they now stand in this
country, it cannot safely be affirmed that the law will lend its aid to
enforce the pooling contracts between railroads. It seems on the
other hand more than probable that the courts will declare that such
contracts are not sanctioned by the law. This is said irrespective of
any opinion upon the question whether, as an original proposition,
such ought to be the result. The early decisions in New York,
which have given a certain tendency to subsequent judicial thought
and action, were made with little or no investigation of the subject
involved, and without any attempt whatever to show that
the principle by which the legality of arrangements to avoid in
jurious competition must be tested had been overlooked or disre
gard d in the contracts before the court. But they have stood with
out much question to the present day; in their conclusions they fall
in with prevailing notions of what is public policy on the subject,
there is, a priori, a strong presumption, legal as well as popular, that
they are correct; and they are likely for all these reasons, whether
sound or not, to stand as precedents which courts will expect to fol
low. If that shall be the result of any litigation, or if the compa
nies themselves shall look upon such a result as possible, and there
fore decline litigation, the companies entering into pools must rely
for the enforcement of their contracts upon the honor of the cor
porate officers and agents, and upon the methods that may be de
vised for making it to the interest of the several contracting parties
to observe their agreements.
SANCTIONS FOB POOLING CONTRACTS.
Penalties to be imposed by the association will be out of the ques
tion. They will not be paid voluntarily by parties who will not vol
untarily observe their agreements, and they cannot be collected by
law. No doubt it might be made part of the pooling arrangement
that a fund should be provided by proportionate contributions, and
that from the sum paid in by any member a penalty assessed against
it should be paid; but it would be easy for such member, if dissatis
fied, to enjoin the payment, or, in case of its failure to take steps for
that purpose, for any of its stockholders to do so. Penalties, there
fore, cannot constitute a reliance.
The principal danger to be guarded against is the cutting of rates.
In the unregulated and unreasoning strife between railroad com
panies this cutting is not only carried on to an extent that is ruinous
to the companies themselves, but it becomes a disturbing factor in
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all commerce ; and it is perfectly correct for the railroad companies
to say, as they do when defending pooling, that unjust discrimina
tions are a necessary result. The sort of competition which is "the
life of trade" in a war of rates, incites every agent fto make secretly
and by every form of indirection such terms as will secure the busi
ness; it is inevitable that these shall be without uniformity, and
that those who push hardest and bargain most — -which will generally
be the large shippers—will be most favored. Low rates, when they
can be depended upon for any considerable time, increase the prices
of grain and other market commodities in the hands of producers;
but they affect prices little if at all when it is uncertain from day to
day and from hour to hour what they are to be, and consequently
such benefits as come from the hostile cutting of rates are reaped
principally by speculators and other large shippers. It is doubtful
if the shipping interest ever receives benefits equivalent to the losses
which the railroad interest suffers in a war of rates, and the benefits
to the general public will seldom equal the incidental injuries.
Nothing therefore can be plainer than the desirability that reason
able rates should be maintained with general uniformity, so that
they may be calculated upon in the making of contracts and
purchases, and so that small shippers as well as large, the man who
merely sends his household goods as well as the speculator in grain
and provisions, may have the benefit of them.
So far as the steadiness in rates tends to the benefit of the rail
roads, it is also particularly desirable for a reason not often men
tioned. It is a great misfortune to the country that so many of its
roads pay no dividends. Though worthless to the stockholders such
roads have in the stock market a speculative value, and in the hands
of speculating men the stocks become mere implements of gambling,
and the roads are managed with a purpose alternately to put up and
put down the quotations on the stock board, that the managers may
make profit from the sales and purchases. It is beyond doubt that
larger fortunes have been made in the manipulation of some worth
less roads with a view to deceptive appearances for stock jobbing
purposes than would have been derived from dividends equal to the
current rate of interest. This is an evil, not solely because of its
fostering the prevailing tendency to demoralizing and ruinous specu
lation, but also for the further reason that it increases and strength
ens among the people at large a widespread prejudice against rail
road managers as men who contrive to accumulate great fortunes at
« 18
the public cost. Undei the influence of this prejudice it may well
happen that the charge's* a railroad makes for transportation, though
barely sufjcient to cover all the items of expense, will be thought
exorbitant by the community, who see the members of the managing
board acquiring wealth through the ownership and management of
the sfbck. Nor are the community to be blamed for this, for they
have a right to assume that all the profits made by managers are de
rived from the earnings of the roads. Thus non-paying roads not
only foster speculative gambling, which is one of the most demoral
izing of existing evils, but they also tend to excite in the community
a feeling against railroad managers and railroad property, which
gradually extends to embrace all forms of aggregate and especially
of corporate wealth ; and this feeling in any time of unusual excite
ment or distress is liable to break out into uncontrollable fury, and
to seek gratification in destruction. All property owners, and all
law-abiding and patriotic people, are therefore directly concerned in
removing, so far as may be in their power, the causes which are
likely to originate or to foster such dangerous tendences.
But without the aid of the law to enforce pooling arrangements,
it is not as yet apparent that any scheme can be devised whereby
the cutting of rates can be effectually prevented. Entering into a
pooling arrangement is an admission that unrestricted competition
is destructive; but when the pooling agreement is departed from and
one road begins to cut rates, the others, in self protection must be
suffered to cut also. This is not enforcing the pooling agreement;
it is destroying it. Possibly if the combination were sufficiently ex
tensive, a refractory road might be temporarily crippled, and thus
brought to terms by the others refusing to exchange business with
it; but their power in this regard is much restricted by the law pre
scribing the duties of common carriers. Besides, a road boycotted
by others because it is cutting under their rates will be likely to have
the public sympathy as a road suffering persecution in the public
interest; and this sympathy will give it valuable assistance. It may
well happen, therefore, that an attempt at boycotting will prove a
mortifying failure. It is certain that it could not be relied upon as
a general remedy for the breach of a pooling agreement.
But these common arrangements, though unprotected by the law,
have, nevertheless, done very much to save railroad property from
needless injury. They bring into existence a commission or other
common authority in which all the parties have confidence, which is
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charged with the duty to keep the peace between the roads, to hear
mutual complaints, to investigate charges of the breach of their
common agreements, to give redress, so far as advisory power can
do so, and to concentrate public opinion in railroad circles upon any
member failing to observe its covenants, and make it feel the public
censure. It is natural to expect that the benefits will increase as
the managers become accustomed within the agreed limits to sub
mit to the direction and control of the common authority. But a
pooling arrangement is only a treaty of peace; as a combination it
has little coherence ; and the passions of a single railroad manager,
the failure of a single agent to keep faith, or the nervous eagerness
to keep rolling stock employed when the offerings of property for
transportation are light, may at any time break it down. No
treaty is law except so long as the contracting parties can see
that it is probably for their interest to observe it, and the suspected
breach of good faith in a treaty is commonly sufficient to breed an
actual breach.
THE FUTTTKE.
That the railroad problem, so far as it is involved in wars of rates
between the roads, cannot as yet be considered solved is very mani
fest; the railroad companies have only made an effort in the direc
tion of solving it. Common agreements, if they had the encourage
ment and protection of the law, would very probably supply it; but
for that purpose legislation would seem to be essential. But legis
lation would be mischievous rather than beneficial, unless it was
conceived in the spirit of statesmen, and was made to express
neither special favor for, nor special hostility to, the interest it
would regulate. The railroad interest of this country represents an
enormous aggregate of wealth, and an increasing aggregate of cor
porate poverty; and it has immense capabilities for good or evil to
the people. It cannot possibly be for the interest of any country
that so large a proportion of the invested capital should be wasted or
unremunerative, especially when in that condition its necessary
tendency is to favor dishonest management and gambling specula
tion. On the other hand, it is for the interest of the country that
the public shall receive, in as large a degree as shall be pos
sible, the benefits which were calculated upon in providing by
law for the building of the roads. Begulating legislation
should, therefore, be conceived neither exclusively in the inter
est of railroad companies nor in the spirit of hostility to them.
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What the country needs is that they shall be made useful; not that
they shall be crippled or bankrupted, or made stock-jobbing con
veniences for their managers. And no doubt when the whole sub
ject is carefully examined and wisely considered, it will be found
that the true interests of the owners of railroad property may be
made to harmonize perfectly with the true interests of the public,
and that it will be as wise for the state to encourage and protect what
ever in corporate arrangements is of beneficial tendency as it will to
suppress what is mischievous. T. M. Cooley.



